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Japan has been experiencing sluggish economic growth for the last two decades aer bursting of a 
bubble economy in the early 1990s. e Japanese economy started to show a sign of recovery since  
December 2012, when Mr. Shinzo Abe took over Prime Ministership. Faced with a number of structural 
problems including aging population, serious scal situation, inexible labor market, regulated and pro-
tected markets, Japanese economy is in a very dicult situation to achieve high and sustained growth. 
One eective policy to achieve sustained economic growth is to implement Prime Minister Abe?s growth 
strategy, third arrow of his three-arrow strategy. Specically, speedy conclusion of the TPP and RCEP ne-
gotiations, which are under way, and eective implementation of structural policy reform would enable 
Japan to continue its economic recovery and to achieve sustained economic growth. 
I.?Introduction
e Japanese government joined the Trans-Pacic Partnership (TPP) negotiations in July 2013. It 
took the Japanese government 2 years 4 months to make the decision formally to apply for the partici-
pation in the TPP negotiations since a former Prime Minister Naoto Kan of the Democratic Party of 
Japan indicated an interest in joining the TPP negotiations in November 2010. Since Mr. Kan?s an-
nouncement, the TPP issue has led to heated debate between pro and anti TPP groups. Indeed, this de-
bate has attracted so much attention of the Japanese people that it is described as the debate dividing 
the public opinion into two. Roughly speaking, the debate takes the following; competitive business 
(pro-TPP) vs. non-competitive agriculture (anti-TPP). It was current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of 
the Liberal Democratic Party that formally announced his intention of joining the TPP negotiation in 
March 2013, aer he became Prime Minister in December 2012 by winning a Lower House Election. 
e Japanese government had to wait for 90 days before formally being accepted into the TPP negotia-
tion by the negotiating members. Prime Minister Abe seems to consider the TPP one of the most im-
portant foreign economic policy agendas, if not the most important agenda, as he has assembled a 
team of approximately 120 government sta for the TPP negotiation and assigned Mr. Akira Amari, a 
senior LDP member, a minister in charge of the TPP negotiation.
In light of the importance of the TPP in current policy discussions in Japan, this paper attempts to 
examine the economic issues concerning the TPP in Japan. Section II discusses the problems facing 
the Japanese economy, which performed very badly in the last two decades. Indeed, a long recession, 
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which started aer the bursting of a bubble economy in the early 1990s, lasted for about twenty years, 
and as such these twenty years are described as the lost two decades for the Japanese economy. e 
analysis in section II sets the stage for the discussions of the TPP, or free trade agreements (FTAs) in 
general, because FTAs, particularly the TPP, have been considered important policies for the Japanese 
economy to recover from the recession and to get back on the economic growth trajectory. Section III 
examines Japan?s FTA policies, as the TPP is one of the most important FTAs for the Japanese econo-
my. Aer reviewing Japan?s FTA developments, some notable characteristics of Japan?s FTAs are dis-
cussed. e discussions reveal that the TPP is a big challenge for the Japanese government, as it seeks 
to achieve a very high-level of trade liberalization, a level that Japan has not been able to achieve so far. 
Section IV discusses the economic benets that Japan can expect from joining the TPP. In addition to 
examining somewhat theoretically the expected benets, estimated impacts by using a simulation 
model are presented. As was mentioned above, there are groups in Japan that oppose the TPP. Section 
V identies these groups and examines their reasons for the opposition. Recognizing the opposition, 
section VI provides possible ways to deal with the opposition and to play active and constructive role 
in concluding the TPP negotiations. Section VII concludes with some remarks.
II.?Pessimistic Future Prospects of the Japanese Economy
e Japanese economy is faced with a number of structural problems, which have to be overcome in 
order for the Japanese economy to recover and get back on a growing trajectory. Since the collapse of 
the bubble economy in the early 1990s, the Japanese economy has been struggling with low growth for 
over 20 years (Figure 1 and Figure 2). e most signicant structural problems are an aging and 
shrinking population. Economic growth is achieved through a mutual relationship between the factors 
of the supply side and the demand side, but the situation is severe for both these sides. On the supply 
side, to achieve economic growth it is necessary to increase labor input, to increase capital input, or to 
raise productivity, but the aging and shrinking population is making it hard to increase labor input or 
capital input. e Japanese population fell in 2005, and although it temporarily rose in 2006, it has 
been falling continuously since 2007 (Figure 3). According to the estimates of the National Institute of 
Population and Social Security Research, the current population of over 120 million people will drop 
below 100 million in 2046, and will become 90 million in 20552. Meanwhile, the labor force has been 
shrinking since 1995, and is predicted to continue to fall in the future as well. If population decline 
cannot be reversed, it would be dicult to increase labor input without promoting labor by women 
and the elderly or receiving foreign workers.
To increase capital input, domestic saving or investment from abroad is necessary, but Japanese do-
mestic saving is decreasing due to the progression of the aging population, and the inux of capital 
2 National Institute of Population and Social Security Research, ?Nihon no ShoraiSuikeiJinko (Heisei 18 nen 12 gatsusuikei) 
chuisuikei [Japan?s Future Projected Population (December 2006 Projection) Central Projection]? http://www.ipss.go.jp/syoushika/ 
tohkei/suikei07/suikei.html#chapt1?1
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from overseas is also weak due to the uncertain future of the Japanese economy. e overall domestic 
savings rate was 33.7? in 1990, a high gure even among the developed countries, but has steadily 
dropped, reaching 21.4? in 2010.3
3 World Bank, World Development Indicators Online.
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Figure 2?GDP of Japan, China, and the US
Source: World Bank, World Development Indecates on line
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Economic growth cannot be expected from the demand side either. Due to population decline and a 
low growth rate, consumption is not growing, and due to the fact that future consumption will not in-
crease, it is expected that investment will stagnate. Also, the government is saddled with enormous 
debt exceeding double the GDP, and so it is dicult to expand spending in a manner that would lead 
to real demand (Figure 4). Since it is expected that public spending on social security and healthcare 
will increase due to the rapid progression of the aging of the population, if the integrated reform of so-
Figure 3?Japan?s Population: Past Trend and Future Projections
Source: Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Aairs and Communicaiton
Figure 4?Government Debt?GDP Ratios for Selected Countries
Source: OECD
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cial security and taxes currently being debated is not implemented, the scal situation will worsen, and 
the likelihood of economic growth will become ever smaller.
Also, amidst the circumstances of rapidly progressing globalization, due to the ?closedness? of its 
market and society, Japan remains unable to take advantage of the opportunities granted by globaliza-
tion for the mutual exchange with other countries of important factors for economic activity including 
goods, services, capital and people. is can be understood from the fact that the proportion of trade 
and foreign direct investment as a share of GDP is lower in Japan than in other countries. Specically, 
exports (goods and services)-GDP and imports (goods and services)-GDP ratios for Japan in 2011 
were 16.5 and 17.4 percent, respectively (Figure 5), which are lower than APEC averages of 25.0 and 
25.9 percent, while outward FDI stock-GDP and inward FDI stock-GDP ratios for Japan were 16.5 and 
3.9 percent, respectively, which are signicantly lower compared to the APEC averages of 24.2 and 23.2 
percent (Figure 6).4
e circumstances in which the Japanese economy is placed are quite severe, and it was understood 
that just maintaining the status quo would force a pessimistic view of its future. To escape from this 
situation and realize economic prosperity in the future, it is necessary to promote economic activity 
and increase productivity through furthering structural reforms and market opening. It is also eec-
tive to intensify economic exchanges with Asia, where high growth is expected in the future. One im-
portant policy to achieve these objectives is participating in FTAs including the TPP and RCEP.
4 APEC, APECStat on line.
Figure 5?Trade (Goods and Services)?GDP Ratios for Selected APEC Economies: 2011
Source: APEC, APECStat on line
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III.?Japan?s FTAs
Japan became interested in FTAs at the end of the 1990s5. Japan?s rst FTA was with Singapore, and 
it came into force in November 2002. Following this, Japan?s FTA negotiations centered on the coun-
tries of ASEAN, and as of June 2013, 13 FTAs had come into eect, 12 bilateral FTAs, each with Singa-
pore, Mexico, Malaysia, Chile, ailand, Indonesia, Brunei, the Philippines, Switzerland, Vietnam, 
India, and Peru (in the order of establishment) as well as one regional FTA with ASEAN (Table 1). 
Japan is currently negotiating FTAs with South Korea, Australia, the countries of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC), Mongolia, Canada, Colombia, China-South Korea (CJK FTA), the European Union, 
ten ASEAN member countries and ve countries including China, South Korea, India, Australia and 
New Zealand under the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the TPP. FTA 
negotiations with South Korea began in December 2003, but were broken o in November 2004 due to 
opposing opinions on the negotiation framework and have not restarted thereaer. In the cases of CJK 
FTA, Japan?EU FTA, and the RCEP, there were political and economic obstacles to the agreement in 
prospective FTA partner countries to start negotiations, but with one reason being Japan having indi-
cated strong interest in joining the TPP, these were overcome. ese prospective FTA partners were ea-
ger to include economically inuential Japan through FTAs before Japan would join the US-led TPP 
negotiations. Japan had to overcome strong opposition from agricultural and medical sectors, in order 
to join the TPP negotiations.
5 See Urata (2011a) and Kawai and Urata (2012) on Japan?s FTA policies.
Figure 6?FDI Stock?GDP Ratios for Selected APEC Economies: 2011
Source: APEC, APECStat on line
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Traditionally, Japan?s trade policy proceeded under the principle of non-discrimination between all 
member countries in the framework of the GATT/WTO multilateral trading system, although there 
were exceptional cases where special trade measures such as voluntary export restraints were adopted 
bilaterally with the US to deal with trade frictions. However, it now proceeds in a multi-layered man-
ner, pursuing discriminating frameworks resulting from bilateral/regional FTAs, which are recognized 
under certain conditions by GATT and the WTO. ere are a number of causes behind Japan becom-
ing interested in FTAs. One is the rapid increase in FTAs in the various regions of the world. Under the 
circumstances of virtually stalled WTO trade liberalization negotiations, many countries with an inter-
est in liberalization have started establishing FTAs. As a result, Japan has also become interested in 
FTAs in order to secure export markets. Furthermore, the international movements of investment and 
people, for which rules under the WTO have not been established, have intensied in international 
economic activities, and so Japan and other countries have a heightened interest in FTAs in order to 
set the rules on them. 
By concluding FTAs with developing countries such as the ASEAN countries where barriers to trade 
and investment are still high despite the progress of liberalization, it is possible to establish an environ-
ment in which it is easy for Japanese rms that have entered into these countries to conduct business 
activities. Also, there are hopes that FTAs, which further an opening up to other countries, can play a 
Table 1?Japan?s FTAs
FTA Partners Start of negotiations Signing of agreement Enactment of agreement
In action Singapore
Mexico
Malaysia
Chile
ailand
Indonesia
Brunei
ASEAN
Philippines
Switzerland
Vietnam
India
Peru
Jan 2001
Nov 2002
Jan 2004
Feb 2006
Feb 2004
Jul 2005
Jun 2006
Apr 2005
Feb 2004
May 2007
Jan 2007
Jan 2007
May 2009
Jan 2002
Sep 2004
Dec 2005
Mar 2007
Apr 2007
Aug 2007
Jun 2007
Apr 2008
Sep 2006
Feb 2009
Dec 2008
Feb 2011
May 2011
Nov 2002
Mar 2005
Jul 2006
Sep 2007
Nov 2007
Jul 2008
Jul 2008
Dec 2008
Dec 2008
Sep 2009
Oct 2009
Aug 2011
Mar 2012
In negotiation South Korea
GCC
Australia
Mongolia
Canada
Colombia
China?Japan?S. Korea
EU
RCEP
TPP**
Dec 2003*
Sep 2006
Apr 2007
Jun 2012
Nov 2012
Dec 2012
Mar 2013
Apr 2013
May 2013
Jul 2013
Notes: * Negotiations with South Korea was suspended in November 2004.
** TPP Negotiations began in March 2010. Japan joined the TPP negotiations in July 2013.
Source: Ministry of Foreign Aairs and newspaper reportings.
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complementary role in promoting the domestic structural reforms necessary for activating the 
Japanese economy. Furthermore, in the FTAs with developing countries in East Asia such as ASEAN 
and India, there is also the intention to aid the economic development of partner countries through 
economic cooperation. By actualizing the high latent growth potential of the East Asian countries, 
not only can an increase in Japanese exports be expected, but social and political stability in the East 
Asian region can also be realized. In addition to economic motives, there is the non-economic motive 
to concluding FTAs of building close political and social relations with FTA partner countries.
Two important observations regarding Japan?s FTAs are to be noted. First, the FTA coverage ratio, 
that is, the proportion of trade covered by FTAs, for Japan is small. As noted earlier, Japan has enacted 
13 FTAs with 15 countries. e proportion of trade with these 15 countries in Japan?s overall trade 
stood at 18.6 percent based on the statistics for 2010. is FTA coverage ratio for Japan is substantially 
lower compared with the United States (38.8?), South Korea (34.0?), and ASEAN (60.0?), while it 
is slightly higher compared with China (16.2?) and India (17.9?). Japan?s low FTA coverage ratio is 
due to the absence of FTAs with its large trading partners such as the US, China, and the EU. Diculty 
in liberalizing agriculture market, which is demanded by many potential FTA partners, has precluded 
Japan from establishing FTAs with those countries. If all the FTAs, which are in negotiation, are suc-
cessfully enacted, Japan?s FTA coverage ratio would rise to approximately 80 percent.
Another notable characteristic of Japan?s FTAs, which is related to the observation just made, is low 
level of trade liberalization. Japan has excluded politically sensitive agricultural products from trade 
liberalization. Table 2 depicts the FTA liberalization rate, dened as the share of imports for which tar-
is have been eliminated in total imports vis-à-vis FTA partners, on a product basis and an import val-
Table 2?Trade Liberalization Ratios for Japan?s FTAs
FTA
Partners
Tari line Trade Value
Data years used for the computation
Japan Japan Partner Total*
Singapore
Mexico
Malaysia
Chile
ailand
Philippines
Brunei
Indonesia
ASEAN
Switzerland
Vietnam
India
Peru
84.4
86.0
86.8
86.5
87.2
88.4
84.6
86.6
86.5
85.6
86.5
94.7
86.8
94.1
90.5
91.6
91.6
99.99
93.2
93.2
99.3
94.9
97.5
99.7
100
98.4
99.3
99.8
97.4
96.6
99.9
89.7
? 91
99.7
87.7
90.3
99.9
99
96
97
92
95
94
99.9
92
?
99
92
94
99.8
2005
2002
2004 (Japan), 2003 (Malaysia)
2005
2004 (Japan), 2003 (ailand)
2003
2005
2004.5?2005.4
2006 (Japan), 2005/2006 (ASEAN)
2006
2006
2006
2008
Notes:  Proportion of tari lines/import values in total tari lines/import values within 10 years.
* means approximate gures.
Sources:  Data on tari lines come from Ministry of Foreign Aairs, and data on import values come from Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry.
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ue basis. For Japan?s FTAs, the FTA liberalization rate on a product basis is around 85?, and is no 
greater than 90?. Although not shown in the table, the liberalization rates of the FTAs of developed 
countries including the US, the EU, Australia, and New Zealand range from around 95? to 100?. 
ere is a prevailing view that TPP would require at least 95 percent liberalization rate, making it di-
cult for Japan to join the TPP. Looking at the liberalization rate on a trade value basis (since it is not 
easy to obtain information regarding the liberalization rate on a product basis for Japan?s FTA part-
ners), it can be seen that in many cases, the FTA liberalization rate for Japan is lower than that of part-
ner countries. 
IV.?e benets of Joining the TPP
When considering the advantages and disadvantages of joining the TPP for Japan, it is important to 
consider the TPP to be a path towards the establishment of the Free Trade Area of Asia-Pacic (FTAAP). 
If the FTAAP, which provides a free and open business environment, is created, there is a high likeli-
hood of developing into a global free trade area in the future due to the large share of the world econo-
my held by the countries/regions belonging to it. With the FTAAP formed as a development of the 
TPP, rules would be established not only for trade liberalization but also domestic economic system, 
and so if the FTAAP expands globally, it would result in the creation of an economic system that goes a 
step beyond the WTO in the form of a true global economic system. Here, the signicance of the TPP 
to Japan is considered in light of suppositions such as those above.
e TPP would expand trade and promote economic growth among its members due to bringing 
about market opening among those members.6 e following discussion treats Japan as the subject, 
but the same eect can also be expected for the TPP members. Indeed, the TPP would have the eect 
of promoting the growth of each of its members, and so this eect would act synergistically and lead to 
even greater results for the membership. If the TPP is formed, export opportunities for Japanese cor-
porations would expand through the market opening of the participating countries, and at the same 
time imports of foreign products would expand through the opening of the Japanese market. e ex-
pansion of exports from Japan would lead to growth in the Japanese economy through expanding em-
ployment and production. Meanwhile, an expansion in imports would reduce the production of do-
mestic products that compete with imports, and would have the possibility of negatively aecting 
employment. However, if workers and funds shi from the production of import-competing goods for 
which demand is shrinking to the production of export goods for which demand is rising, workers and 
funds will be used eciently, and growth can be expected for the economy as a whole. Regarding the 
eect of the TPP on the Japanese economy, the results of a variety of studies have been reported. An 
estimate by the Cabinet Oce using a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model is 0.66 percent 
increase in Japan?s GDP, and this is what would result if the mechanisms mentioned above were in op-
6 Regarding an empirical analysis of the eect of Japan?s FTAs on Japan?s trade, see Urata (2011b).
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eration. Such an eect is called the static eect of trade liberalization.
ere are factors that are important as eects of the TPP, but are not taken into consideration in a 
CGE model analysis by the Cabinet Oce, and as a result, there is the high likelihood that the Cabinet 
Oce?s projections are underestimations. First, there is the high probability of increased productivity 
as a result of an expansion in exports and imports, but such an eect of increased productivity is not 
taken into account. By expanding contact with overseas markets through exporting, exporting compa-
nies acquire information about ecient technology and management know-how, and so are able to in-
crease productivity. Also, in order to prevail in intense competition in overseas markets, companies 
must achieve increased productivity. Furthermore, if the amount of production increases as a result of 
exporting, it would become possible to enjoy the benets of scale economies and further increase pro-
ductivity. Meanwhile, an expansion of imports would lead to stronger competitive pressure on com-
peting domestic companies, which would cope with by introducing ecient techniques and develop-
ing new technology and new products. As a result, productivity would rise. Such an eect is called the 
dynamic eect of trade liberalization. ere is a common view that this eect would greatly continue 
over the long term.
As an eect that is included in the Cabinet Oce estimates, it is necessary to touch on the trade di-
version eect, which arises from favoring member countries and discriminating against non-member 
countries as in the TPP.7 Participation in the TPP by Japan would result in the elimination of taris on 
imports from TPP member countries, but the existing taris would be maintained for imports from 
non-member countries, and so products imported from non-member countries would be replaced by 
products from member countries. As a result, consumers would benet from becoming able to pur-
chase imported goods at a low price. Meanwhile, producers would incur losses due to decreased pro-
duction and prices resulting from increased imports, and the Japanese government would experience a 
loss due to losing tax revenue. Here, if the total of the losses exceeds the benets, it would be a detri-
ment to Japan as a whole. e likelihood of losses resulting from the trade diversion eect becomes 
greater if the ecient producers are in non-member countries, in other words if ecient producers are 
not included in the TPP. Since Japan imposes a high tari on agricultural products, if countries that 
are ecient in the production of such products are included as TPP members, there would be a low 
likelihood of losses due to the trade diversion eect. Also, one important policy implication derived 
from this discussion is that in order to mitigate/avoid losses due to the trade diversion eect, it is eec-
tive to increase the membership of the TPP. In other words, by increasing membership, the likelihood 
of excluding ecient countries decreases.
It must be noted that through the trade diversion eect, countries excluded from the TPP or an FTA 
would incur losses due to an inevitable decrease in exports. Indeed, this negative impact of exclusion 
from an FTA has led to the proliferation of FTAs, as those countries excluded from FTAs set up new 
7 Incidentally, the eect of expanding trade among member countries as a result of an FTA, as discussed earlier, is known as a 
trade creation eect. Regarding the economic eects of FTAs, see, for example, Appleyard and Field (2013).
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FTAs or join existing FTAs, in order to overcome the negative eects from exclusion.
A second possibility for the Cabinet Oce estimate of the eect of the TPP being an underestima-
tion lies in the fact that the TPP includes wide-ranging contents consisting not only of trade liberaliza-
tion but also investment liberalization, the movement of people, and others, which are not considered 
in the model. e expansion of investment resulting from liberalization of investment would have a 
large eect on the economy due to causing a variety of eects in production, employment, trade, and 
technology transfers. Indeed, trade and investment liberalization would facilitate the creation and ex-
pansion of regional production networks, or supply-chains by multinational enterprises, contributing 
to economic growth of the region. e movement of people with high levels of ability would also pro-
mote economic growth due to enabling ecient production. It should also be noted that trade and FDI 
facilitation such as simplication of customs procedures and harmonization of product standards, 
which would be included in the TPP, would promote trade and investment, which in turn contribute 
to economic growth.
A third possibility for an underestimation is in the fact that the eect of the TPP in triggering do-
mestic regulatory reforms and structural reforms is not included. For example, suppose that liberaliza-
tion of the agricultural sector were promised in the TPP. e Japanese government is likely to imple-
ment regulatory reforms and structural reforms to deal with problems in the agricultural sector such 
as farmland problems and product distribution problems, in order to increase productivity. As a result, 
such an increase in productivity would be expected. In sectors other than agriculture as well, if regula-
tory reforms and structural reforms are promoted by the TPP, a similar eect of increasing product-
ivity could be expected.
Here, the discussion returns to the benets of the TPP to Japan. e TPP includes the formation of 
rules in areas in which international rules have not been suciently put in place, such as government 
procurement, competition policy, and intellectual property rights. If rules are established for these ar-
eas and they are strictly enforced, Japanese rms would benet due to it becoming possible to conduct 
business deployment in a highly transparent, fair, and predictable business environment. For example, 
with respect to government procurement, an Agreement on Government Procurement was imple-
mented under the WTO, and Japan is a party to this agreement. However, not all WTO member coun-
tries are parties to this agreement. Among the TPP negotiating countries, only the US, Singapore, and 
Canada are signatories to the Agreement on Government Procurement. Consequently, if the TPP suc-
cessfully includes the rule on government procurement, Japan would become able to enter government 
procurement markets in the TPP negotiating countries aside from the US, Singapore and Canada, 
such as Australia and New Zealand. Of course, if in the future the TPP expands from the Asia-Pacic 
to the whole world, it would become possible to enter government procurement markets across the 
globe, expanding business opportunities for Japanese corporations.
In arrangements for competition policy, it is expected that competition rules for preventing damage 
caused by limiting competition such as through cartels would be set, but there is also the possibility of 
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creating rules for the behavior of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). If such rules are established and, if 
China joins the TPP in the future, the private rms of Japan and the other TPP members would be 
able to compete on equal footing with China?s SOEs. With respect to intellectual property rights, if 
rules protecting these rights such as patents and copyright become established and upheld, Japanese 
businesses, which are experiencing large losses due to counterfeit goods, would be released from those 
losses and in addition to increasing prots, conducting business overseas would become easy.
We began our discussions of the benets of joining the TPP by Japan by arguing that the estimated 
impacts by the Cabinet Oce are likely to be underestimates because it did not include many import-
ant factors. According to Petri et al. (2012), which incorporates many features that are not considered 
in the study by the Cabinet Oce such as investment and productivity increase, Japan?s participation 
in the TPP would increase Japan?s GDP by 2.0 percent, signicantly greater than 0.66? estimated by 
the Cabinet Oce.
V.?Obstacles to TPP participation
e greatest obstacle to participation in the TPP is the opposition of uncompetitive sectors. Uncom-
petitive sectors would suer damage due to a reduction in production and employment resulting from 
the expansion of imports that would be brought about by the trade liberalization of the TPP. Conse-
quently, in order to avoid this damage, these sectors strongly oppose the TPP. At present, the strongest 
opposition to the TPP comes from the agricultural sector, which is said to be uncompetitive. e aver-
age tari for agricultural products in Japan is relatively low compared to that of other agricultural 
product importing countries. What is prominent in the agricultural protection in Japan is the generous 
protection of certain specic agricultural products through an extremely complicated protection sys-
tem that combines high taris with import quotas. For example, rice (778?), wheat (252?), sugar 
(379?), and konnyakupotato (1,706?) are subject to a specic rate duty, but are extremely high when 
converted to an ad valorem duty.8 Also, in the Uruguay Round agreement, Japan introduced a mecha-
nism to be able to use special safeguards in the case of damage from sudden and substantial importa-
tion.
e agricultural protection policy has been an obstacle to moving forward with FTA (EPA) negotia-
tions thus far by the Japanese government. In the EPA with Singapore, despite minuscule agricultural 
production in the city-state, Japan excepted agricultural products from liberalization. e treatment of 
pork became the source of debate during the Japan?Mexico EPA negotiations. Despite the strong re-
quest from Mexico that the level of protection for pork imports to Japan should be lowered, Japan went 
so far as to take the measure of increasing import quotas for beef, chicken, oranges, and orange juice, 
which Mexico had not requested, but it did not budge for pork. In the EPA negotiations with other 
countries as well, Japan faced problems with agricultural liberalization. EPA negotiations that faced 
8 e gures in parentheses have been converted to ad valorem duties. ese gures are according to Honma (2010). See same 
for Japan?s agricultural protection policy.
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Japan?s strong opposition over the treatment of agricultural liberalization include the Japan?Philippines 
EPA (bananas, rice, wheat, starch, dairy products, beef, pork, sugar, and canned pineapple), the Japan?
ailand EPA (rice, sugar, boneless chicken, and processed chicken), and the Japan?Chile EPA (shery 
products and pork). Additionally, the following agricultural products are problematic in the FTA cur-
rently being negotiated with Australia and the TPP for example: the treatment of rice for Australia and 
the US, the treatment of beef and pork for Australia and the US, the treatment of sugar for Australia, 
and the treatment of dairy products for Australia and the US.
In the TPP negotiations the LDP government made it clear that it tries to exclude ve agricultural 
products (rice, wheat, beef/pork, dairy products, and sugar/starch) from import liberalization. e 
number of tari lines covering these ve agricultural products amount to 586, accounting for approxi-
mately 6? of overall tari lines.9 If Japan attempts to treat these products as exceptions, Japan will not 
be able to sign the agreement because other negotiating countries are trying to achieve much higher 
level of trade liberalization.
Among these products with high protection, the treatment of rice is the most dicult to liberalize in 
Japan, for the reasons that follow. First, rice is a core product with about a 25? share of agricultural 
production in Japan. Second, from a geographic point of view, rice is produced across Japan. And 
third, there are many sectors related to rice production. For example, the construction industry, which 
is involved in public works such as maintaining farm roads and irrigation, politicians, bureaucrats, the 
machine industry, which provides agricultural machinery, the chemical industry, which provides fer-
tilizer, and the agricultural cooperatives, which provide various services such as funding and distribu-
tion of agricultural products and fertilizer, believe that they will incur tremendous damage due to the 
collapse of the status quo that would result from liberalization and structural reform. Finally, although 
this applies generally to the agricultural sector rather than just rice cultivation, the fact that a single 
vote in rural agricultural areas during elections carries greater weight than one in the urban areas (vote 
disparity) is a reason that agricultural protection, which is the hope of the agricultural sector, is sup-
ported politically.
Besides the agriculture sector, the medical service sector is opposing the TPP, arguing that the TPP 
would destroy national health insurance system in Japan, which is said to have contributed signicant-
ly to improving health conditions of the Japanese people. According to them, introduction of market 
mechanism in determining the pharmaceutical prices and allowing prot-making private company to 
enter the medical service sector would lead to undermine the foundation of the medical service system 
in Japan, resulting in breaking down of the national health insurance system.
Another barrier to moving forward with the TPP is the fact that there are almost no politicians who 
have a positive vision of the future for Japan from a mid- to long-term perspective, and who are per-
suasive and can get things done. As stated earlier, many politicians are opposed to the TPP. Since the 
9 See Table 2 for trade liberalization for Japan?s FTAs.
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greatest objective for politicians is to be elected and re-elected, and to participate in politics in the leg-
islatures, they aim to achieve that through promises to reect the needs and wishes of their constitu-
ents. In such circumstances, even a politician who considers participation in the TPP to be desirable in 
the mid- to long-term would promote policies protecting the politically powerful agricultural sector. 
However, the current Abe administration appears dierent from the earlier administrations. e Abe?s 
LDP won an upper house election in July 2013, aer winning a lower house election in December 
2012, which enabled Prime Minister Abe to come back to become a leader again. is means that he 
will be free from the election for the next two and a half years, and thus he is in a position to pursue 
his policies without worrying about the next election.
It was argued that the problem in the obstacles to moving forward with the TPP lie with the politi-
cians, but to get right down to it, the problem lies with the citizenry that supports those kinds of politi-
cians. e people have not grasped the signicance of the TPP or the signicance of market opening 
and structural reforms. In the backdrop to this lies the fact that information about the benets of such 
policies has not been disseminated, and more specically, the fact that reports and education on this is 
lacking.
e people who would be harmed by the TPP are just a subset of the population, but since that harm 
would be extremely severe in the form of falling income and unemployment, they form a strong oppo-
sition movement in order to avoid such circumstances. Indeed, the forces opposing the TPP are mak-
ing appeals for the opposing view centered on publications such as books and newspapers for the gen-
eral populace, and the distribution of pamphlets for politicians like the members of the national 
legislature. In an anti-TPP pamphlet that the author has on hand, there are shocking and inammatory 
slogans such as ?rough liberalizing investment, Japan and Japanese corporations will be eaten alive 
by foreign capital,? ?e collapse of the regional economy due to opening government procurement to 
foreign corporations,? and ?Even if Japan joins the TPP, it will just be force-fed disadvantageous rules.? 
In this way, an argument is deployed against the TPP, the contents of which have yet to be decided as 
they are being negotiated. Naoi and Urata (2014) showed that people?s perception of the TPP is very 
much inuenced by the active campaign by the opposition groups based on the Google search trend 
data.
Meanwhile, although it is true that the people who would benet from the TPP would be able to 
sense the benets through being able to purchase imported goods at a low cost, the degree to which 
they would feel this is not so large. Also, even though economic growth would be promoted, it would 
be hard to recognize that this was due to the TPP. As a result, even though they would be in favor of 
the TPP, this does not really lead to a strong movement. Of course, there is a movement in favor of the 
TPP consisting of the industrial sector, for which increased exports would be expected through partic-
ipation in the framework, but it is much smaller in scale and intensity than the opposition movement. 
is asymmetry in harm and benet is another obstacle to moving forward with the TPP.
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VI.?Towards participating in and moving forward with the TPP
To move forward with the TPP, it is necessary to overcome the barriers discussed in the previous 
section. In this section, a method to do that is considered. As a response to the opposition by those 
who would be harmed by the TPP, the government basically needs to form and eectively operate a 
safety net that can minimize the damage. Specically, in response to income reduction and unemploy-
ment resulting from import liberalization under the TPP, it is necessary to provide temporary income 
compensation and education and training to nd a more productive job. Under the Democratic Party 
of Japan, former leader Ichiro Ozawa had called for promoting FTAs together with individual house-
hold income support as a set, but before the Upper House election in 2007, he abandoned the FTA 
promotion and only pledged the individual household income support, which later was implemented. 
With events proceeding in this manner, the TPP and FTAs will not progress. A safety net for import 
expansion has been built as a trade adjustment assistance in the US and South Korea, and is being im-
plemented. Japan should take into account the experiences of these countries and implement a similar 
system.
To move forward with the TPP, it is a necessary condition for the Japanese people, and among them 
especially the politicians, to have a recognition of the important role the TPP would play in realizing 
social stability and economic prosperity in the future of Japan. To satisfy this necessary condition, rst, 
it is necessary for there to be the recognition that the Japanese economy is in an extremely severe situt-
ation. Specically, it is necessary to disseminate information of the sort presented in Section II to the 
people and the politicians. Next, it is necessary for the citizenry to understand that the TPP is an eec-
tive means for escaping from the severe situation. To do this, theoretical explanations lack persuasive-
ness, and so it is necessary to explain using examples of the benets that Japan has achieved in the past 
through liberalization and structural reforms. For example, it should be explained in an easily under-
stood manner using examples of success through trade liberalization including the experience of im-
port liberalization for beef, oranges, and cherries, which had moved forward amidst strong opposition. 
Also, it is necessary to convey the fact that one of the important factors behind high growth in the 
countries of East Asia including Japan was the promotion of trade liberalization and structural re-
forms. Meanwhile, when building the safety net towards moving forward with the TPP, the mistake 
must not be repeated of when six trillion yen of subsidies, which were provided to the agricultural sec-
tor as a countermeasure for the partial liberalization of rice during the Uruguay Round, were spent on 
paving agricultural roads and excavating hot springs instead of on increasing the competitiveness of 
the sector or education and training for farmers.
It is necessary to provide information on the benets of the TPP as discussed above and the re-
sponse to the damage that could occur as a result of the TPP using a variety of opportunities such as 
the media, education, and public lectures in an easily understood manner. In particular, debates with 
those who oppose the TPP should be taken advantage of in an eective manner.
Up to here, the debate over going forward with the TPP has been discussed, but nally the impor-
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tance should be emphasized for Japan to actively participate in and promote the TPP in the Asia-Pacif-
ic as well as RCEP as an economic integration of the Asian countries. e TPP not only liberalizes and 
facilitates border measures pertaining to trade and investment, but also goes so far as to build econom-
ic rules for domestic economic activities. By contrast, in the RCEP, economic cooperation for resolving 
developmental disparities and liberalizing trade and investment are important issues in East Asia, 
where there are many developing countries. Japan is one of few countries that can participate in build-
ing these two frameworks by playing an important role. Japan must seize this opportunity and not 
merely revive its own economy but also contribute to the economic prosperity of the Asia-Pacic re-
gion. Economic prosperity in the Asia-Pacic would promote further revitalization and growth in Ja-
pan. e prosperity of the Japanese economy and of the economy of the Asia-Pacic are strongly inter-
related.
VII.?Concluding Remarks
e Asia-Pacic region and the emerging/developing countries of ASEAN and China that are locat-
ed in East Asia have been recording high growth in recent years, and have been called the growth cen-
ter of the world. Although there is the high likelihood that the growth rate of these countries will slow 
in the future, it is nevertheless anticipated that there will be higher growth compared to the other re-
gions of the world. Meanwhile, despite being in East Asia, the economy of Japan does not have a bright 
future outlook because of a number of structural problems including declining and aging population, 
huge accumulated government debt, and closed economy.
Having noted the dicult situation in which Japan has been trapped, Japan can still recover and re-
gain economic growth if an appropriate set of economic policies were implemented. e rst two ar-
rows of Abenomics, aggressive monetary policy and exible scal policy, have produced expected pos-
itive eects. What has to be done now is to shoot the third arrow, that is, growth strategy. Appropriate 
and eective growth strategy should include drastic domestic structural reform such as agricultural re-
form and substantial market opening in goods, services, capital, and people. One eective way to 
achieve these goals is to participate in the region-wide FTAs including the TPP and the RCEP. Now 
that Japan is participating in their negotiations, Japan needs to contribute to speedy conclusion of 
these negotiations. Japan should take a leadership role in these negotiations by coping with domestic 
opposition with appropriate policies including provision of safety net for negatively aected people. 
Indeed, the establishment of the TPP and the RCEP would lead to the FTAAP, an APEC-wide FTA, 
which in turn would lead to a world-wide FTA or a global free trade system. It is important for Japan 
and other Asia-Pacic countries/economies to realize that the creation of these arrangements would 
contribute to economic growth of these countries/economies.
?     ?19
Japan?s Economic Recovery and the TPP
References
Appleyard, Dennis and Alfred Field (2013), International Economics, 8th edition, McGraw-Hill, New York.
Honma, Masayoshi (2010) Gendai Nihon Nogyo no Seisaku Katei [Policy Making Process of Modern Japanese Agriculture], Keio Uni-
versity Press, Tokyo. [in Japanese]
Kawai, Masahiro and Shujiro Urata (2012) ?Changing Commercial Policy in Japan, 1985?2010,? in Mordechai E. Kreinin and Mi-
chael G. Plummer eds. e Oxford Handbook of International Commercial Policy, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 225?
251.
Naoi, Mugumi and Shujiro Urata (2013) ?Free Trade Agreements and Domestic Politics: e Case of the Trans-Pacic Partnership 
Agreement,? Asian Economic Policy Review, vol. 8 no. 2, pp. 326?349.
Petri, Peter A., Michael G. Plummer, and Fan Zhai (2012) e Trans-Pacic Partnership and Asia-Pacic Integration: A Quantitative 
Assessment, Peterson Institute for International Economics, Washington, D.C.
Urata, Shujiro (2011a) ?Japan?s New Trade Policy: from GATT and the WTO to FTAs,? Journal of Asia-Pacic Studies, Waseda Uni-
versity, No. 17, October 2011, pp. 41?60.
Urata, Shujiro (2011b). ?Economic Impacts of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs),? e International Economy, No. 15, pp. 75?95.
